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On Ledewitz:
A Review of American Religious Democracy
by Bruce Ledewitz
Mark D. Yochum*
The Duquesne Law Review has permitted me this space to write
on Professor Bruce Ledewitz. Do not judge too harshly this jour-
nal for allowing one with apparent conflicts of many interests to
engage in what should be a dispassionate and uninterested aca-
demic exercise. The reader might judge after my disclosures
whether my interests fatally wound my persuasiveness. I freely
confess I aim to persuade that one should read Ledewitz's book,
American Religious Democracy (Praeger 2007). I hate many of its
parts wholly; I could not put it down.
I have known Ledewitz for all my days here at Duquesne Uni-
versity School of Law, since Reagan was President, before the first
shuttle disaster. He is my neighbor in our offices. Our wonderful
secretary who helped make his book has typed this piece out for
me. We have lived a harmonious academic life, rarely disagreeing
about the vertiginous molehills of administration in a law school.
Even when on matters of such policy we disagree, we discuss with
civility, frankness, and affection. He sings with a lovely tenor. He
is a wonderful caring person. He is a resource of unquestioned
expertise on all things constitutional, state and federal. Despite
my affection, I must reveal that I find American Religious Democ-
racy a profoundly disturbing view of American politics and consti-
tutional law.
As a professor of Professional Responsibility, I am by trade at-
tuned to evaluating interests in conflict. To that end, in prepara-
tion of this piece, I reviewed the literature of the ethics of review-
ers. I found no standards-merely complaints that the reviewer
had personal, professional, or financial animosity or the reviewer
engaged in mere careerism, fulsome flattery, to brighten prospects
with the author or in the field. There is even a body of literature
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that suggests biased reviews are better or, maybe, just more fun.
Disclosure of my affection for the author reveals my chief bias.
I am also disinclined to put much faith in contemporary obser-
vance of events that conclude with an assessment of the historicity
of those events. Our judgments are clouded by living in the time.
Even descriptions of the events themselves are but misted first
representations of what in a significant sense happened. Contem-
porary observation in the matter of religion, politics, law, war and
peace lacks perspective.
Ledewitz and many others do not share my historian's timidity.
Ledewitz sees a body politic in America swayed by religious val-
ues. He sees a resurgence of traditional American religious values
articulated as a wholesome and right reason to have the state
support those values. The banishment of the discussion of tran-
scendent in public was temporary and has ended. Ledewitz jousts
with the other tillers in this field, the philosophers of the now.
Ledewitz holds that for awhile (say, mid-seventies to late nineties)
Godliness was not seen as something discussable, shunned by
academics and secularist commentators. Ledewitz tilts with the
stars of the anti-God field. He says that religion must be part of
public discourse, if for no other reason, because, in a democracy,
we may choose religion as we may choose any theme for public
discourse.
Now, a moment's pause on religion and democracy. Ledewitz
has two senses, perhaps more, for the notion of religion. In his
prose that set me to steam, religion (the American religion) is of a
type of evangelical Christian, not literally, but in limine. His book
has a dust jacket, with the photo of a cleric (his head is cropped at
the chin and you cannot see his knees) holding a crucifix and a
Holy Bible. He thought that the representation may offend my co-
religionists; a Catholic priest, as evidenced by the crucifix, is not
the sign he had intended. But, to me, Catholic from cradle to the
impending grave, I told him that the image was not of a Catholic
priest. I knew because he was holding the Bible. Catholics pray
prayers. We are encouraged to read the Bible for comfort, not per-
sonal interpretation. A Catholic priest would hold a breviary, not
the Bible. For Ledewitz (his publisher got this right) the Bible
serves as inspiration, the breath, of American Religious Democ-
racy.
Religion for Ledewitz also has a second sense that is, I fear,
idyllic. Since the religious Christian has triumphed, now all must
come together in a religious way, an American religious way. And
here I fear is his greatest error-that that American religious way
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must be tolerant, patient, giving, and kind. Nonetheless, he would
conclude that these are truths, truths about religion, that all
would agree to at root. And here he deftly surveys those thinkers
and jurists as to whether the state can support a Great God with-
out quibble.
Tolerance and religion qua religion are rarely harmonious in
Western Civilization and pervasive tolerance, a fairly recent
achievement. The Romans, the Mongolians, the Ottomans and
their imperious Islamic cousins, are all empires noted for their fair
tolerance of domestic religious differences; the Catholic Church
did not formally endorse freedom of religion until Vatican II.
While Ledewitz is four square with the anti-abortion position, he
is four square for civil gay marriage. Gay marriage is a matter of
justice and, one would suppose, democracy.
When Ledewitz writes of democracy, he is writing about the law
and more specifically, how the law changes. This piece itself is
evidence of a growing genre, contemporary commentary with an
admixture of social criticism, global theories, and philosophies of
all sorts. Works of this type have been inhibited in the academic
setting because of a lack of discipline in the classic sense. Is this
journalism, history, autobiography, sociology, theology, rhetoric or
law? For American Religious Democracy, the answer is yes. And,
undeniably, as such, the book is evidence of legal scholarship. The
book, too, with its range and fervor, is evidence of the author's will
and courage to advocate for the law, as good professors of law have
done for at least 500 years.
American Religious Democracy is adamantine. Written through
and after President Bush's reelection in 2004, Ledewitz's book pos-
its that the democratic sway in our country is held and will be
held by the Church, people of God. This democratically decisive
role will allow for religious rhetoric on issues to be respected, if
not necessarily to prevail in an election. Communal exercises of
religious feeling will be less restricted. The Church's view on
dominant issues that have religious import will certainly prevail,
in the courts and in every law-making institution. The irreligious
values of the Enlightenment will be rejected, like excessive indi-
vidualism, materialism, sour rationality.
While I have written in future tense, for Ledewitz, the future is
now. The elections of 2006 were an inevitable trough in history's
uneven but sure progress to this Church-dominated state. Even
he admits that essentially bad war gets 'em every time. So we live
in a religious democracy. What are we to do? For Ledewitz, we of
the church and we of the world must recognize the inevitability of
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the triumph of the Church. For Ledewitz, history has a shape,
shaped by the hand of God. We are ineluctably drawn to follow
that curve and we will be judged, judged as a whole nation, if we
stray from God's good hand.
Know, dear reader, that I envision you contemplating with ei-
ther vague horror or positive warmth the foregoing paragraphs.
Ledewitz chops American Democracy in two. My secularist
reader's blood simmered with a promise of boiling later. My reli-
gious reader recognized truth (or, maybe, Truth) and felt a satis-
fied glow in the testimony of Ledewitz. For Ledewitz, a secularist
is one who makes choices in public life based on lame Enlighten-
ment rationality. Faith-based rhetoric does not move you, save
possibly to offense. A religionista gives primacy to faith in public
life. The sermon moves you more and galvanizes your resolve to
bring to pass a polity pleasing to God.
As this piece of mine on Ledewitz has been kindly nestled in a
law journal (albeit Catholic), I must suspect (as he would) that in
plurality most of my readers are secularist. Professor Ledewitz
recognizes that his duality is unclear: there is religion for the
secularist, and there are rationalists among the religious. Yet for
him and many contemporary observers, a sort of taxonomy of each
type can be drawn ordered by the type's resolution of a gradient of
issues. Many might believe the economy primarily determines
elections, but that pocketbook matter only obliquely is used as a
discriminator for Ledewitz. No, the package of core issues that
divide us for Ledewitz is abortion, gay rights, and government-
sponsored communal religious experience. Furthermore, a reli-
gious voter votes based on these core issues as being the most im-
portant issues. A voter who detests abortions but voted based on
our current war is probably not a religious voter.
Concurrent with the inevitable political triumph of the religious
voter will be the triumph of the Republican Party. The Democrats
have experienced no religious revival and do not convincingly use
the rhetoric of religious thought or feeling to advance their posi-
tions. Indeed, secularists are taken to task not only for their un-
just intellectual ban on religious discourse in the public square,
but also because they are uneducated or just plain stupid about
religion. Secularists cling foolishly to the Enlightenment dodge
that you should have "reasons" for public actions. And mere un-
variegated Deism will not make the cut; religion for Ledewitz in
our democracy means the Bible.
This general posture causes the contemporary reader who is not
religious to blanch. That is, the most problematic portion of the
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work is his observation of current politics and his predictions for
the near term. I found it most difficult as a practicing Catholic to
find myself irreligious and marginalized politically. Thus, for me,
no single issue determines my vote and it is my understanding
that formally my Church has no such requirement. For example,
a candidate supporting our current War that our previous pope
condemned yet is anti-abortion does not deserve my vote over a
candidate with the opposite views on both issues. In practice,
however, I will admit as a suburban Church goer, in 2004, virtu-
ally every homily I heard was a barely undisguised speech to vote
Republican and the only issue was abortion. I am still waiting in
the parishes I visit to hear of John Paul II's condemnation of the
War. I will be old and gray before I hear a homily condemning the
death penalty in my local church (although it is the Church's posi-
tion), even with the most horrible example of the penalty hanging
there before us. To be fair, I have heard from other co-religionists
(Republican religious voters) that they are tired of their parish
priest praying for peace, viewed by them as a call to vote Democ-
ratic. And please know that I do not yearn for political homilies of
any sort. Wisely, most speeches in most years properly turn on
the simple virtues of the Faith, Hope, and Charity.
Professor Ledewitz recognizes these dislocations and contem-
plates another book called "Hallowed Secularism." For now, Le-
dewitz is very deft and challenges the legal faith of the religious in
an unexpected way. Ledewitz takes to task the jurisprudence of
Justice Scalia and his faithful, with their devotion to plain lan-
guage. Ledewitz argues that this dead reading of our living
document inhibits full development of the religious polity. For
Ledewitz, the Constitution breathes. For example, the textualist
approach may overrule Roe v. Wade but provides no basis for pro-
tecting the fetus or, for that matter, the homosexual, or the creche.
His analysis of the Establishment Clause cases provides a juris-
prudence to allow the state in some measure to support religious
expression without having a state that punishes blasphemers.
Professor Ledewitz believes that religion-and, more specifi-
cally, the Bible-is foundational to democracy. His charitable
reading of the Bible (both Old and New Testament) avoids two
millennia of sins committed in the name of religion. He asserts
the Bible is about the worth of the individual (but not too much)-
that is, democratic. In fact, this small measure of individual
autonomy, in the judgment of some, comes from the Protestant
Revolution, disposing of the cleric as a necessary interlocutor be-
tween you and God. He asserts (in a full whopper) that Marxist
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forces, not religious ones, subjugated women although he quotes
without irony the Biblical dictum that man and woman are one.
He asserts that we collectively are responsible for the sins of oth-
ers, the sins of the nation. And that it is proper and just that citi-
zens in a religious democracy may regulate, indeed, must regulate
the sinful conduct of all, even non-believers.
That there will be a judgment upon a nation for allowing evil is
a difficult proposition to follow. We secularists do not believe that
the United States has been ordained by God for a particular mis-
sion. I note that our previous national sins have not caused us to
be visited with Sodom-like destruction. To be fair, God's judgment
will not be visited upon us (forgive me) Biblically. Ledewitz calls
Pat Robinson a "clown" for his horrible pronouncement that mod-
ern scourges (Katrina, AIDS) are punishment for sin. Maybe
slavery was punished by the Civil War. But I would argue that
America had no Democracy until the real suffrage, unfettered by
race, occurred circa 1964. Was there judgment for the murder of
the Native Americans, our subjugation of the Philippines, our im-
perialist wars, our labor practices, our support of a reduced status
for women, our environmental insensitivities? While philosophi-
cally Ledewitz's arguments that we are a religious democracy may
persuade, he naturally has some trouble explaining practice. Por-
nography is freely available. Popular culture celebrates sinful
lifestyles, from Sex and the City to The Sopranos, even to the un-
cabled Friends. Divorce is common and nearly expected. Reli-
gious people argue that property is an unfettered right, really
God-given. Indeed, free enterprise is frequently offered as part of
the story of God, although maybe unleashed enterprise produces
oppression, systemic poverty, and denigration of individual work
roles.
Professor Ledewitz wonders whether this provocative work is a
work of legal scholarship. Emphatically, I say yes. If nothing
more, the work should encourage us moderns to recognize that
religious analysis of our legal structures is critical to seeing those
structures clearly. Law and laws are built on a 1000 year old
structure of Western Civilization. Religion is everywhere in our
law, so engrained, so recessed, we fail to see it. Our President still
takes an oath, our juries are a mystical twelve. Notions of sin,
rather than secularism, fashion our laws on drugs, sex, welfare,
poverty, the environment.
I have called this short piece "On Ledewitz" as I did not just
want to comment on his book, but upon him. The book is difficult,
dazzling, infuriating, and risky. He is at once polymath and
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prophet. The book is a hard suggestion, at many points, for fur-
ther study, for citizens, lawyers, and judges. This style of writing
is out of fashion in the legal academy, maybe since Erasmus called
for tolerance and peace in the age of Martin Luther. Yet, Profes-
sor Ledewitz, a victim of duty, felt compelled to speak.
At once with his efforts with this controversial book, Professor
Ledewitz is conducting a very public campaign with respect to
(what I will call) reform of the Pennsylvania judiciary, particularly
our Supreme Court. I will not here recount the points in his pro-
posals, although they are all rational, with nary a hint of prayer.
With this campaign, Professor Ledewitz has been greeted with
abuse, some from the courts, some from poobahs of the domestic
bar associations. It is hard to say at this point whether he will in
sum gather more vitriol from the campaign or the book. Bravely,
fearlessly, he persists. I cannot defend the positions of American
Religious Democracy. I support most of his proposals for judicial
change. But I do support all his work, his public work, against an
evil canard thrown at him now that this sort of advocacy (the book
and the campaign) is not what law professors are supposed to do.
I have argued that Ledewitz's work with American Religious
Democracy is at once an attempt at prophecy and an endeavor of
legal scholarship. But, is this prophecy, this advocacy, this call to
a particular vision of justice, is that what law professors are sup-
posed to do? To write on Ledewitz requires a fuller description of
his range beyond this book, a book itself which is but a signpost as
to what is ahead. Professor Ledewitz is a crack scholar of the
United States Constitution. He has retired from a long and drain-
ing career as an anti-death penalty advocate. He is a master guru
of the Pennsylvania Constitution and state constitutional law
generally. His leadership created our Pennsylvania Constitution
website, a work of scholarship with intense, almost scholastic
thoroughness and detail. For those not privileged to practice in
the Quaker State, know that our Constitution is a mess. Older
than the Republic, our Constitution has had more iterations than
wise and now exists as a chunky lumbering thing with a mis-
shapen, ill thought-out jurisprudence to match. And Ledewitz,
fearless Ledewitz, has decided to act for change, for reform, for
rational justice.
Suffice for this story of bravery and boldness the knowledge that
his program specifically challenges Supreme Court decisions and,
much more cutting, Supreme Court practices. The former activity
is the stock-in-trade of the Professor, discussing cases and why
they are wrongly decided. Yet, the Professor rarely takes to the
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streets to proclaim the errors. We the timid are content to carp
concealed with the eternal anonymity of law review publications.
Ledewitz, however, sees these decisions (which, again for another
place, are decisions which arrogate to the Supreme Court a stu-
pendous level of control over such issues as taxation or law's prac-
tice) and the manner of Supreme Court rule (our Supreme Court
has declared legislation unconstitutional by using a rule rather
than hearing a case) as modes of thinking and practice that will
not be changed without a dose of democracy. Our judges are
elected and once elected subject every decade to a yea/nay vote on
retention. If the citizens know the judges' positions on the issues
he raises, democracy will take its course. American Religious De-
mocracy seethes with the belief that religion underlies human pol-
ity, with religion bubbling to the top. But Ledewitz is no less a
democrat, with a faith in public advocacy and discussion. If we
are going to vote for judge, let us not ballot in the haze; for Le-
dewitz, we need more light.
A second aspect of Ledewitz's public proposals deals with the
corruptive influence of the Supreme Court's behavior in the new
political realm. Ledewitz's criticism is that this democratic insti-
tution, our Supreme Court, operates with unneeded secrecy. The
lurid example was the Court's participation in the so-called scan-
dal of the midnight pay raise wherein our otherwise politically
divided legislature enacted a raise for itself, the courts, and their
clerks under cover of darkness. Key to the visceral oomph of this
tale is that the bill was passed in the wee hours, as if that which is
done in the dead of night is necessarily suspect, predatory, an act
that would wither in the light of day. Our respect for the legisla-
ture itself has so far fallen. When I was a law student at George-
town, my bedroom window offered a view of the dome of the Capi-
tol, rising above the endemic squalor that was Capitol Hill in the
mid-seventies. And as I squinted at my texts in late and small
hours, I could raise my glance to see the beacon lit at the pinnacle
of the Dome. This beacon of light, by tradition, shone in those
dark hours, to let all within sight know that Congress was in ses-
sion, working for the Republic, tireless, eternal, laboring through
the night. Now, this small bit of inspiration is lost on Pennsylva-
nians as even now there is clamor to prohibit legislating in the
dark. But, perhaps, this distaste and suspicion for politicians, leg-
islators and judges, are just the wages of sin.
Less lurid but equally secretive is our court's exercise of its ad-
ministrative role, non-public politicking with the legislature, non-
public appointment to any number of regulatory boards, non-
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public rule making. Professor Ledewitz believes that this conduct
is anti-democratic and corruptive of virtue. The Catholic might
call it the near occasion of sin.
With the populace riled by citizens' grass-roots movements in
response to the pay-raise hoo-hah, a sitting Supreme Court justice
lost a retention vote, the first such loss ever. And now Professor
Ledewitz who had articulated a series of charges based upon the
scandal has become a target of public vilification not, of course
from the public, but from some indignant of the bench and from
some leaders of the organized bar. (Our wonderful Dean in a fit of
good humor has furnished the colleagues of Ledewitz, campaign-
style buttons with a strike through Ledewitz's image with the em-
blazoned motto, "I am not Bruce Ledewitz".) I have heard him
called disrespectful of the office of Justice. While I do not agree
with all the points in his proposals, I will note that the criticism
that he is disrespectful is not a persuasive reason for concluding
that he is wrong. But in these pages, I challenge the epithet that
he has gone beyond the bounds of law professor, that in this very
practical criticism of our courts or in his very spiritual American
Religious Democracy he has horribly strayed from the right and
just role of the law professor.
His activism, that is putting his thoughts into action, has
pressed me to consider the profession of the law professor. The
law professor is, in a real sense, of the first professors of our West-
ern civilization. Their range of influence over real legal decisions
was vast. Law professors provided a trellis for all law as we know
it by lacing out principle from the tatters of the over-revered
Justinian Code. Law professors were not just scholars, but also
doubled as ambassadors, draftsmen of legislation, cultural stars,
men of the court, the university, and the church. But these men
were polymaths; we live under the burden of our great numbers in
a world of specialties. Thus, our current academy (as I guess the
Greek among us like to call it), the profession of law professors
cannot agree itself on our proper role. In illustration, I offer a
chat with a colleague from another institution, Older than I, an
early boomer, nonetheless, he rued the younger generation of our
ilk. We were devoted to law, case analysis, who shot John, so
forth. Now, they (the others) want to be political scientists, poets,
philosophers; they do not want to read cases. (In fairness, we
agree: who does?) Here is one division in the academy-
scholarship you can use or, well, something else. This struggle is
as old as Erasmus.
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The role of the law professor in our culture (outside of Germany)
diminished as the education of the lawyer was conducted through
an apprentice system. But for us, our model for practice is in the
revival of the law school, its modern recreation in the scientific
Nineteenth Century through the efforts and with vision of the re-
Discoverer of Harvard Law School, Langdell. And it is clear that
that vision was scientific, rational, systematic. I lack the patience
of my editors to draw this theme fully out. But it is this percep-
tion of law professor as scientist, so ingrained, that leads to the
charge that the activist professor is breaching the ethics and stan-
dards of his profession. The law professor is to be the neutral ar-
biter, balancing, teaching the art of doing, running a sort of lab.
Scholarly writings are to be of the same cloth. And religion is by
definition suspect, particularly Roman Catholicism.
That law or life or anything can be reduced to science, including
science, is a hope that has long since passed. The rhetoric of faith
in science by the giants of law schools was stirring, altruistic, and
not fully misguided. Yet when you see the full measure of these
men, you see the role the law professor of vigor and courage can
have in this world.
I have a cracking one-hundred-year-old copy of The Vocation of
the Law Professor by James Barr Ames, Langdell's follower, in-
deed, apostle, to the legal community for the religion of the Law
School. This address was given at the dedication of a devoted law
school facility for old Penn in 1901. While the scientific faith of
the age percolates the talk, real activism is part of the role Ames
had in mind for his ideal law professor. Indeed, one may note that
Ames' view has Ledewitz's religious fervor; to be a law professor is
to have vocation, that is classically to be called by the Voice of
God. First we teach but then we write, to have a "wholesome in-
fluence" on real decisions. Scientific use of precedent is to prevail,
but judges need help and occasionally err. And key to Ames was
the communal role, friend to the legislator, a teacher whose wis-
dom and contemplative life could help practically shape positive
law for the good of the community. This is what Ledewitz is try-
ing to do in the best traditions of our profession.
And so too is his synthesis of law and religion in American Reli-
gious Democracy. I will still balk at whether history has a shape,
shaped by God, that we can see. I am with Procopius, a nascent
historian of circa 550, thoroughly Christian, believing God moved
all but: "For man cannot, I think, apprehend ever human affairs
with accuracy, much less those things which pertain to the nature
of God." Yet traditional legal scholarship has always had the
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breath of God, the eternal, the perfection of man, the process of
civilization at its root. One of my personal favorite texts of legal
scholarship is the magisterial Superstition and Force by Henry C.
Lea, first published in 1870, a "scientific" exploration of torture
and ordeals, wherein he found "the fervor of religious conviction
thus made persecution a duty to God and man." Yet, he saw, in
the late Nineteenth Century, the dawn (as does Ledewitz a cen-
tury later) of an age of luster:
For the first time in the history of man the universal love and
charity which lie at the foundation of Christianity are recog-
nized as the elements on which human society should be
based. Weak and erring as we are, and still far distant from
the ideal of the Saviour, yet are we approaching it, even if our
steps are painful and hesitating.
Lea believed that we had grown beyond state-sponsored torture,
obviously an error. While I have little faith in the prophecies of
American Religious Democracy, I praise the faith of the prophet
and the courage of his testimony. Thus, an encouragement: on,
Ledewitz.
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